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Introduction 
 
 
Shale Gas for a Better Climate? 
The US Fracking Revolution Challenges European and International Climate Policy 
Susanne Dröge and Kirsten Westphal 
Since natural gas surpassed coal in US energy consumption, the country’s carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions have been declining. The United States hopes that this will lead to a 
long-term improvement of its emissions performance. Yet the shale gas boom has not 
spread beyond the United States. It is indeed questionable whether shale gas will be 
able to bring about a turnaround in global emissions as long as the worldwide demand 
for coal continues to rise. From the current perspective, shale gas can be expected to 
produce at most a mixed overall impact on the climate since its future consumption 
depends on the environmental and energy policy decisions of the United States and 
other countries. International market developments are also ridden with uncertainties. 
The potentially sweeping political consequences of the natural gas boom in the United 
States confront European and international climate policy makers with entirely new 
and unexpected challenges. 
 
The growing share of unconventional 
(shale) gas in the global energy mix has an 
impact on the environmental and climate 
performance of the countries that extract 
and use it. The extraction of shale gas by 
means of hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) 
differs from conventional gas production: 
A mixture of chemicals and large quanti-
ties of water are injected into underground 
rock formations through horizontally 
drilled wells, which sets free the trapped 
gas reserves. This energy-intensive process 
also releases methane gas, which has many 
times the greenhouse gas effect of CO2. 
Fracking technology carries with it other 
environmental risks as well, ranging from 
surface and water contamination to noise 
pollution. Under unfavorable geological 
conditions, earthquakes may also be trig-
gered. On the other hand, the combustion 
of natural gas has a significantly lower 
climate impact than the burning of hard 
or lignite coal. 
In the United States, the energy sector 
has responded rapidly to the potential of 
natural gas-fired power generation. Accord-
ing to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
2013, natural gas-fired power production 
increased in 2012 by 21 percent, while coal-
fired power generation fell during the same 
period to its lowest level since 1987, with 
corresponding reductions in CO2 emissions. 
A comparable effect on global emissions, 
however, has not yet emerged. The coal that 
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is no longer needed in the United States 
is being exported to countries with a high 
demand for coal, such as China and India. 
Germany, too, has increased the use of coal 
in power generation: Whereas the share of 
natural gas in Germany’s power production 
declined from 2011 to 2012, the share of 
lignite coal increased by 6 percent. This 
stands in stark contrast to Germany’s cli-
mate policy goals and its planned transi-
tion to renewable energy (“Energiewende”). 
The US Energy Transition and 
its climate impacts 
Under the Copenhagen Accord, the con-
cluding document of UNFCCC (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change) climate negotiations from 2009, 
the United States pledged to cut green-
house gas emissions by 17 percent of 2005 
levels by the year 2020. In 2011, the United 
States produced 6.9 percent lower green-
house gas emissions than in 2005, and in 
2012, emissions from the US electricity 
and transport sector declined as well. This 
was due in large part to three factors: the 
lagging economy, new standards for motor 
vehicles, and the increased use of shale gas. 
Between 2005 and 2012, total natural gas 
production in the United States increased 
from 511 billion cubic meters to around 
681 billion cubic meters. Shale gas pro-
duction increased tenfold up to 2011. Over 
the same period, natural gas prices fell – 
despite the increased demand – from 13 
to around 2 US dollars per million British 
thermal units (MBtu) by 2012. 
Electricity companies have reduced coal-
fired power production substantially due to 
the availability of cheap natural gas. Where-
as in 2005 coal made up nearly 50 percent 
and natural gas barely 19 percent of total 
US electricity production, in 2012 the 
shares of coal and gas were 37.4 and 30.4 
percent, respectively. Since natural gas 
emits only about half as much CO2 on aver-
age as coal in the process of energy gener-
ation, this shift to gas translates into a posi-
tive effect on CO2 emissions. 
The Environment Protection Agency’s 
(EPA) attention lies not only on the emis-
sions produced in energy generation but 
also on other greenhouse gases that accom-
pany shale gas production. The greenhouse 
gas methane has fifty times the greenhouse 
gas impact of CO2 in a 20-year comparison. 
Its comparative effect is only reduced by 
half when viewed over a 100-year time-
frame. Furthermore, substances are emitted 
in the process of shale gas extraction that 
have a negative impact on regional ozone 
and smog levels. To regulate these sub-
stances, the EPA introduced standards for 
the oil and natural gas sector in 2012. A 
side effect of these standards is a reduction 
in methane emissions. Nevertheless, a spe-
cific regulation for methane remains to be 
created. 
The methane gas released in shale gas 
extraction can contribute to a worse net 
emissions balance of shale gas compared 
to coal. According to calculations by US 
institutions, fugitive methane emissions 
from shale gas extraction would have to 
be reduced to less than 3 percent of total 
gas production in order to render shale gas 
more environmentally friendly than coal, 
no matter what time period is used as the 
basis for calculations. Calculations for the 
transport sector estimate that methane 
emissions must be reduced below 1 per-
cent of total gas production to result in a 
net climate advantage of natural gas over 
diesel. For this reason as well, the EPA has 
focused attention on reducing methane 
gas emissions further. 
In his June 2013 Climate Action Plan, 
President Obama announced a comprehen-
sive strategy to curb methane emissions. 
In 2012, methane accounted for roughly 9 
percent of domestic GHG emissions. Since 
methane gas is also released in activities 
such as agriculture and mining, one objec-
tive of the Action Plan is to develop an 
interagency methane strategy. For gas pro-
ducers methane capture may be more 
profitable than flaring or no action, once 
they invest in capturing devices. If the 
United States succeeds in reducing meth-
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ane emissions in the transport sector and 
industry and in moving forward on devel-
oping renewable energies, shale gas use can 
help the United States to achieve the inter-
national climate goal they announced in 
2009. 
A competitive edge for 
US manufacturing 
It remains difficult to forecast how addi-
tional regulatory measures for methane 
emissions will affect the costs of US com-
panies. Up to now, the low price of natural 
gas in the United States has increased US 
competitiveness in the energy-intensive 
sectors. Industries in these sectors such 
as steel, cement, and basic chemicals are 
responsible for large parts of global indus-
trial CO2 emissions, and they have been 
under immense pressure to reduce costs for 
a number of years. The availability of cheap 
energy has thus increased the attractive-
ness of the United States as a location for 
manufacturing. Both European chemicals 
and steel producers have announced to 
invest in the United States. After years 
of the most energy-intensive industries 
moving mainly from Europe to the Middle 
East and China, the shale gas boom has 
created a new pull for manufacturing 
migration from the Old World to the New. 
However, the low price of natural gas in 
the United States is not the only reason for 
“onshoring” manufacturing. Other factors 
include the increased wage costs in Asia, 
the negative impact of outsourcing on 
innovation by US companies, and the lack 
of intellectual property protection in Asian 
countries. Locating as close as possible to 
customers also plays an important role for 
many manufacturers. 
Companies are faced with new uncer-
tainties, however, due to the regulatory 
interventions under consideration to curb 
environmental impacts of fracking. Up to 
now, the US administration has supported 
shale gas extraction: Fracking was explicitly 
exempted from the Clean Water Act by 
the “Halliburton Loophole” in the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005. Changes in the legal 
framework could therefore have substan-
tial effects on the production costs and the 
available supply of shale gas. 
The future of shale gas in the 
United States 
There are some indicators that the three-
fold trend in the United States – increasing 
gas supply, increasing demand, and falling 
prices – has been halted, at least for the 
time being. 
First, the low price level has made un-
conventional gas extraction unprofitable 
to some extent: In the last three years, the 
spot price for natural gas at Henry Hub – 
the main distribution hub on the natural 
gas pipeline system in Erath, Louisiana – 
was below most companies’ extraction 
costs. The break-even point with the current 
technology is around 5 to 8 US dollars/ 
MBtu, whereas the gas price at Henry Hub 
in Summer 2013 was approximately 4 US 
dollars/MBtu. The number of rigs drilling 
for gas has significantly decreased, and the 
equipment has been reallocated to oil 
drilling. This shift has further intensified 
the price pressure, since natural gas is a by-
product of far more profitable oil and gas 
condensate extraction. Future natural gas 
supplies and prices will depend on how 
much “dry gas” is produced as a by-product, 
or how much “associated gas” can be ex-
tracted in the process of oil and gas con-
densate extraction. 
Second, shale gas reserves have a number 
of characteristics that set them apart from 
conventional gas fields. Production rates 
drop off sharply and rapidly over time, and 
exploitation rates are relatively low. For the 
companies involved, but also for the indus-
try as a whole, these are the factors that 
drive costs. A large number of new wells are 
needed to maintain production volume. 
Third, despite the boom, many compa-
nies themselves are in crisis. Even pioneer-
ing companies such as Chesapeake have been 
forced to sell part of their assets to meet 
their financial obligations. This has raised 
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concerns of a “shale gas bubble,” particular-
ly since drilling companies had significant 
incentives to overrate their own gas reserves 
in order to raise capital. Also, around the 
middle of the last decade, companies in-
vested in expensive liquid natural gas (LNG) 
import infrastructures in response to 2006 
predictions by the US Energy Information 
Agency (EIA) of an over 70 percent increase 
in the demand for LNG imports within the 
coming decade. The LNG terminals proved 
to be an expensive and ill-advised invest-
ment. This infrastructure can be used for 
shale gas exports, but it will have to be con-
verted. Moreover, the process surrounding 
export approvals is tedious and its out-
comes are uncertain. 
Fourth, with the consolidation of the 
shale gas market, the large International 
Oil Companies (IOCs) are moving into the 
business as well. They have both an interest 
in the technology as well as the financial 
power to endure the low price phase. They 
are working towards tapping into new 
market segments and want to develop their 
long-term export potential. Two export 
terminals with a total export capacity of 30 
billion cubic meters per annum have the 
official licenses. First exports are expected 
in 2015/2016. As natural gas will also likely 
play an increasing role in the US transport 
sector if the price difference between natu-
ral gas and oil remains, natural gas prices 
are likely to increase in the medium term. 
Can the US shale gas boom 
be exported? 
The shale gas boom in the United States 
raises the issue of whether such develop-
ments could also take place in other coun-
tries, thereby globalizing the positive effect 
on greenhouse gas emissions. Over 80 per-
cent of global energy consumption is met 
by fossil fuels, which in turn are responsi-
ble for over two-thirds of greenhouse gas 
emissions. As natural gas is relatively low 
in emissions compared to coal or petrole-
um, it often hailed as a bridge to a sustain-
able global energy system. Since 2012 at 
the latest, when the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) published its analysis high-
lighting the significance of shale gas extrac-
tion for US energy markets, the possible 
implications of the boom for international 
climate policy have been under serious 
consideration. Hopes of positive climate 
impacts have been further nourished by the 
falling natural gas prices and by favorable 
geological conditions providing relatively 
easy access to shale gas. Optimistic sce-
narios of the potential of unconventional 
natural gas extraction estimate that shale 
gas could contribute up to 30 percent of the 
global primary energy supply by 2015 and 
as much as 35 percent by 2040. The range 
in these estimates is enormous, however, 
since the actual quantities available for 
extraction can only be determined after 
resources have been explored. 
Many countries with high energy con-
sumption have national shale gas reserves, 
which would make extraction appear 
attractive: In June 2013, the US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) raised 
its estimates of global shale gas reserves by 
10 percent over its first report from 2011. 
China and Argentina’s shale gas reserves 
are larger than or approximately compara-
ble to those of the United States. Tradition-
al gas and coal producing countries like 
Russia, Algeria, Libya, South Africa, and 
Mexico have significant shale gas reserves 
as well. Since most of these already have 
an (export) infrastructure, they could also 
consider shale gas extraction, which would 
tend to sustain the global energy market 
and price structures. 
According to the EIA, there are 17.36 
trillion cubic meters of technically recover-
able shale gas in Europe. Up to now, the 
United Kingdom, Poland, Romania, and the 
Ukraine have shown an interest in extrac-
tion. Whereas France has banned fracking, 
the United Kingdom wants to intensify its 
use of the technology. In Poland, some com-
panies have withdrawn their engagement 
after encountering disappointing results in 
early shale gas exploration. Since large gas 
reserves have been discovered in the coun-
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tries on Europe’s borders – in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, for instance – a significant 
potential gas supply exists. The question is 
whether it can be extracted. 
According to EIA estimates, China has 
almost twice the volume of unconventional 
resources as the United States, especially 
(but not only) in the arid western and 
Northern parts of the country. Yet China 
still lacks the technical resources needed 
for rapid development of its shale gas 
reserves. Furthermore, the water require-
ments for current fracking methods are 
extremely high – a problem which, along 
with the lack of both infrastructure and 
service companies could impede shale gas 
extraction. 
None of these countries has a market 
environment so ideally positioned for a gas 
boom as United States – with the possible 
exception of the United Kingdom. The con-
stellation of factors favoring the US market 
includes the political and legal framework, 
investment security, the availability of 
equipment and services, a developed infra-
structure, an established gas market, and 
proximity to consumers, but above all the 
US-specific land ownership rights. 
Despite the uniqueness of the US market, 
the IEA nonetheless predicts the advent of 
a “golden age” for natural gas, forecasting 
that global demand will increase by almost 
50 percent by 2035. For this demand to be 
met, annual natural gas production will 
have to increase to a level corresponding to 
roughly three times Russia’s annual natural 
gas production. More than two thirds of 
this additional demand would have to be 
met by unconventional gas. 
In order for this scenario to become 
a reality, North America would have to 
export significant quantities of natural 
gas to international markets. This would 
reinforce global and flexible LNG trade. 
Whereas the main obstacle in Canada is a 
still inadequate transport and export infra-
structure, it is apparently strategic eco-
nomic concerns in the United States that 
hinder gas export promotion. Washing-
ton’s traditional advocation of free energy 
markets and largely unrestricted trade flows 
is confronted with the competitive advan-
tages of low energy costs. These two con-
siderations have sparked heated debate over 
exporting natural gas. On the one hand, a 
stronger US economy provides the basis for 
a strong US dollar and a declining trade 
deficit. On the other hand, exporting natural 
gas also offers economic advantages, but it 
would create higher prices on the domestic 
market and thus disadvantages for some sec-
tors of the economy. Political discussion of 
these issues in Washington has just begun. 
Threefold division of the inter-
national gas market will delay 
price effects 
A further impediment to the international 
gas boom is the division of the internation-
al gas market into three distinct regional 
markets: North America, the Eurasian trade 
area, and the Asia-Pacific region. Japan, 
South Korea, and China together consume 
two-thirds of globally traded LNG. The 
threefold division of the market has 
resulted in distinct price structures that 
have been affected only indirectly by 
the shale gas boom, with LNG originally 
intended for the United States being 
diverted to international markets. From 
2008 to 2012, LNG imports to the United 
States dropped by almost half. Since early 
2010, the price trend in North America has 
been moving in the opposite direction of 
other regional gas markets. The United 
States, thanks to its highly liquid spot mar-
ket and pricing and trading hubs, with 
Henry Hub as the principle hub, is profiting 
from wholesale trade prices that were 
around one third of the average spot price 
in the United Kingdom. As a result, the US 
boom has tended to intensify the division 
of the global gas market up to now. Gas 
exports would reduce the price differences 
between the United States and Europe but 
would not eliminate them. In the Pacific 
LNG market, however, high risk premiums 
are paid on oil-price-indexed long-term 
contracts, resulting in a 45 to 60 percent 
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higher average LNG price in Korea and 
Japan than in the EU. 
A significant decline in gas prices can 
therefore not be expected in Europe despite 
the US shale gas boom. Gas is supplied to 
the continent mainly through pipelines, 
and is tied – through a hybrid contractual 
and price structure – to suppliers in Russia, 
Norway, and Algeria. Nevertheless, pressure 
is increasing to abandon the principle of oil 
price indexing, which the Russian gas com-
pany Gazprom in particular wants to main-
tain. As a result, Gazprom has been forced 
to make price concessions, and the Nor-
wegian company Statoil has changed to 
spot market indexing and also reduced 
transport fees. 
All this suggests that the price and 
volume pressure on traditional suppliers 
will continue, at least in the short to 
medium term, as companies diversify their 
portfolios – for instance, with import con-
tracts for LNG from Canada. In addition, 
the EU has accused Gazprom of “unfair 
pricing” and launched an antitrust probe 
in September 2012. It remains uncertain, 
however, how the price formulae used in 
long-term contracts will develop. LNG from 
North America could be an attractive 
option for the European market. But since 
it would not trigger a steep drop in prices, 
the overall price effects would be too weak 
in the short term to substantially increase 
the use of gas compared to coal. 
Coal consumption has a decisive 
impact on the climate 
Even if the gas price outside the United 
States does drop significantly in the near 
term, and if this is followed by an increase 
in the gas supply, positive climate effects 
would still only occur if natural gas replaced 
coal in power production on a large scale. 
Natural gas could be used to an increased 
degree in the transport sector as well, espe-
cially in shipping and freight transport, 
and could gradually replace petroleum. 
It has been emphasized repeatedly in the 
international climate debate that a drama-
tic turnaround in emissions trends is 
needed by 2020 to prevent dangerous levels 
of global warming. In 2013, the IEA out-
lined four proven measures that could be 
taken using currently available technol-
ogy to reduce global warming at no net 
economic cost. Along with measures to 
increase energy efficiency in buildings, 
phase out fossil fuel subsidies, and reduce 
methane releases from the oil and gas 
industry, measures to curb the use of coal 
are of key importance: According to the 
IEA, the construction and use of inefficient 
coal-fired power plants in particular should 
be phased out. 
As reported in the BP Statistical Energy 
Review 2013, the international consumption 
of coal has continued to grow in the brief 
period since the beginning of the shale gas 
boom in the United States, but at a slower 
rate. The increased use of gas in the United 
States manifested itself in a 12 percent 
reduction in coal use in the year 2012, 
although coal production declined by just 
7.5 percent. In Asia and Europe, both the 
consumption and production of coal con-
tinued to rise. China leads the world with 
almost 48 percent of global coal produc-
tion, and in 2012 was also responsible for 
more than half of the world’s coal con-
sumption for the first time ever. India’s 
demand for coal increased by almost 10 
percent in 2012. The United States and 
Europe (including the Ukraine) held 
approximately equal shares in global 
coal production at 13.4 and 12.2 percent, 
respectively. Germany is the EU’s largest 
coal consumer: Whereas the rate of coal 
consumption declined in almost all other 
EU countries in 2012, it rose in Germany 
by 3.9 percent. 
In the longer term, global total energy 
demand will continue to grow. If climate 
and energy policy is not designed to coun-
ter this trend, coal will hold its position 
as the leading fuel source worldwide. If 
there is not a global shift from oil and coal 
to natural gas, these three fuel sources will 
maintain their approximately equal shares 
in the global energy mix, at around 26 to 
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28 percent each, leading up to 2030. This 
will have severe consequences for climate 
change, since global energy demand is 
expected to increase nearly 40 percent by 
that time. 
 In the short term, global coal consump-
tion will depend crucially on economic 
development in China. Economic down-
turns like the current one have a direct 
impact on energy demand and provide 
short-term alleviation of the problem. 
From a longer-term perspective, accord-
ing to IEA forecasts, even in the United 
States, gas could fall to around 27 percent 
of total energy production and coal could 
remain above 40 percent unless coal con-
sumption is reduced in line with the 
Obama administration’s regulation plans. 
If China shifted to shale gas, this would 
have a substantial influence on the global 
energy mix. However, the country is cur-
rently missing the basic conditions that 
would allow for such a change of course. It 
still lacks the decisive incentives to invest 
more in low-carbon energy sources. The 
Chinese government is promoting the 
expansion of renewable energies and is 
testing emissions trading in some of its 
major economic zones, but the question 
remains how strongly this will affect the 
energy sector and whether it will be com-
patible with Chinese growth ambitions. 
Effects on European policy and 
climate negotiations 
The dawning of a new “golden age” of gas – 
and thus the use of gas as a “bridge” to a 
low-emissions energy system – will not 
come about automatically in Europe (or the 
rest of the world) even if more natural gas 
becomes available at lower prices. For this 
to happen, political decisions and regula-
tory interventions will be needed to make 
natural gas a more viable alternative to 
coal. Up to now, German and European 
energy and climate policy have not given 
natural gas a key role in the transformation 
of national energy systems or in climate 
protection. The downward trend in CO2 
prices, the rapid expansion of renewable 
energies, and existing power capacities 
have favored coal-fired power generation. 
The shale gas boom has raised issues that 
place additional strain on the energy and 
climate policies of the EU and its Member 
States. First, Member States are split over 
the risks and opportunities of fracking 
technology. Second, increasing domestic 
energy costs are inducing parts of European 
industry to oppose further EU climate 
policy ambitions that could affect their 
competitiveness. 
In addition, the EU’s most important 
climate policy instrument – the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) – has 
lost most of its vigor. In late 2012, the price 
of CO2 emissions allowances reached its 
lowest level to date and no longer has an 
impact on the use of fossil fuels. The two-
digit CO2 prices that were originally en-
visaged would create clear advantages for 
the use of renewable energies and natural 
gas compared to coal. Basing calculations 
on coal and gas prices from spring 2013, 
the CO2 price would have to be approxi-
mately €40 to €45 per ton to make natural 
gas commercially viable compared to coal. 
In order to achieve such a price, the supply 
of carbon certificates would have to be 
reduced substantially. 
The European energy market structures 
have shifted further as a consequence of the 
German energy transformation (“Energie-
wende”). Gas-fired power plants could make 
a more flexible contribution than the exist-
ing coal-fired power plants to stabilizing 
the fluctuating German electricity gener-
ation from renewable energies. But the 
price of power on the energy exchange 
has fallen significantly since 2011, due to 
the guaranteed feed-in for wind and solar 
energy and the need to keep coal and 
nuclear power plants running at a certain 
level, but especially to the principle of 
the “energy only” market and its so-called 
merit order effect: the share of renewable 
energy on many days is so high that this 
brings about low or even negative energy 
prices on the energy exchange. In this 
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event, it is only the cheap (coal-fired) con-
ventional power plants that prove to be 
commercially viable. The actual price per 
megawatt hour is set by the power plant 
with the highest variable costs. A newly 
built and efficient gas power plant would 
operate on a higher cost level than the 
existing coal plants and would no longer 
pay off. Thus, investments are not made in 
new power plants, and the existing modern 
gas power plants are not economically 
efficient. 
At the international level, the EU Com-
mission and national European climate 
policy makers must continue to grapple 
with the implications of the US shale gas 
boom. After all, the United States will prop-
agate this energy source together with the 
Obama Climate Action Plan in UN negotia-
tions as a strategy for “clean” energy pro-
vision (which includes a mix of renewable, 
biomass, shale gas, and nuclear energy), 
with the goal of taking on a leadership role 
among the global economic powers. The EU 
is coming under increased pressure to take 
clear action, having by now essentially lost 
its claim to leadership. A potential area 
in which the EU could again take the lead, 
however, is in expanding renewable ener-
gies. Such an approach will only be cred-
ible, however, if the costs of energy supply 
are reduced and if Member States abandon 
their go-it-alone approaches. These weak-
nesses within the EU have undoubtedly 
come to the attention of other countries, 
and they endanger the credibility of the 
pioneering role that Europeans and in par-
ticular Germans have worked for years to 
establish. 
The competitive advantages offered by 
the low price of natural gas in the United 
States has sparked a discussion that is 
influencing efforts to develop a new EU 
climate and energy strategy up to 2030 as 
well as the reform of EU ETS. If the Obama 
administration succeeds in implementing 
its climate strategy, the United States will 
be considered an international model for 
climate policy. The EU and Germany will 
only be able to meet this competition by 
promoting their own model for energy and 
climate policy, instead of compromising it 
in the light of an uncertain and perhaps 
temporary US shale gas boom. 
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